UK and Australia establish nuclear safeguards partnership

UK and Australia establish nuclear safeguards partnership

British and Australian regulators have agreed closer nuclear safeguards cooperation. Their new memorandum establishes arrangements for joint research, technical exchanges, inspector training, and expertise development relating to nuclear material accountancy and security.


IN Brief:

  • ONR and Australia's ASNO have signed a dedicated memorandum covering nuclear safeguards and security cooperation.
  • Joint research, staff exchanges, technical collaboration, and inspector training will support the two regulators' capabilities.
  • Cooperation includes preparation for emerging reactor technologies and civil maritime nuclear applications without replacing existing regulatory responsibilities.

The UK’s Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) has signed a nuclear safeguards and security cooperation agreement with the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO), establishing a dedicated framework for sharing technical expertise, conducting joint research, and developing regulatory capabilities.

The memorandum of understanding was signed during the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Safeguards Symposium in Vienna and confirmed by ONR on 13 November. It is the British regulator’s first dedicated international framework for collaboration covering nuclear safeguards and security.

The agreement provides for joint research, technical cooperation, staff exchanges, and professional training. Both authorities expect to develop expertise relevant to existing nuclear activities and emerging technologies as the requirements of their national safeguards systems evolve.

ONR has identified nuclear material accountancy, inspector competencies, professional development, and the regulatory challenges associated with newer reactor designs among the areas where cooperation could strengthen the organisations’ capabilities.

Nuclear safeguards provide the arrangements through which states demonstrate compliance with their international obligations concerning the peaceful use of nuclear material. They include accounting systems, reporting requirements, verification activities, and controls intended to detect the diversion of nuclear material from declared civil uses.

These functions differ from nuclear safety regulation. Safety requirements address the prevention and mitigation of accidents and the protection of workers, the public, and the environment from hazards associated with nuclear facilities and activities.

Nuclear security concerns protection against malicious acts, including theft, sabotage, and unauthorised access. Safeguards and security arrangements can involve related information and protective measures, but they serve different regulatory objectives and must be assessed against their respective requirements.

ONR is responsible for regulating nuclear safeguards in the UK and operates within the country’s State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material. Its responsibilities include assessing compliance with domestic safeguards legislation and supporting verification activities undertaken by the IAEA.

Material accountancy provides a central component of that system. Organisations handling relevant nuclear materials must maintain records of inventories, receipts, transfers, processing, and other activities affecting the quantities or locations of material under their control.

These records support the declarations required by the regulatory framework. The information must be sufficiently accurate and complete to allow the relevant authorities to verify material holdings and investigate inconsistencies between declared inventories and the physical circumstances at a facility.

Verification activities may involve examination of records, physical inventory checks, measurements, inspection of accounting arrangements, and the use of containment or surveillance technologies. The methods applied depend on the type of facility, material, and applicable safeguards requirements.

The UK safeguards system also supports inspections and other verification work carried out by the IAEA under the country’s international agreements. ONR’s domestic regulatory responsibilities and the IAEA’s international verification functions are distinct but closely connected.

ASNO performs related functions in Australia, where it operates within the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Its responsibilities include administering nuclear safeguards requirements, material accountancy arrangements, reporting obligations, and controls associated with Australia’s international nuclear cooperation commitments.

The Australian system uses permits and compliance codes to establish requirements for organisations possessing or handling relevant nuclear materials. These arrangements can specify inventory accounting duties, physical protection measures, reporting obligations, and access for inspections undertaken by ASNO or the IAEA.

Permit holders must maintain information that supports Australia’s national safeguards arrangements and its declarations under international agreements. Compliance inspections and regulatory visits provide mechanisms through which the authorities can assess whether the required controls are being maintained.

The new memorandum gives ONR and ASNO a formal route for exchanging experience in these regulatory activities. Joint technical work could support the development of inspection practices, training materials, and methods for evaluating nuclear material control arrangements.

ONR has identified its established safeguards professional development programme and ONR Academy as areas from which ASNO may benefit. Inspector training involves building knowledge of regulatory requirements, material accountancy systems, verification methods, and the circumstances in which particular inspection techniques are appropriate.

ASNO brings experience in nuclear non-proliferation and international safeguards implementation. Its involvement in Australia’s nuclear cooperation arrangements provides a complementary source of expertise on material control, regulatory reporting, and compliance with international obligations.

The agreement also comes as the UK continues updating its domestic safeguards requirements. Amendments to the Nuclear Safeguards Regulations took effect in July 2026, introducing changes to facility information, reporting arrangements, and the application of regulatory powers.

The revised requirements include a transition towards standardised IAEA Design Information Questionnaires for reporting technical information about nuclear facilities. Changes relating to facility modifications and repurposed facilities also affect the information operators must provide to the regulator.

These developments provide a practical context for cooperation on inspector training and regulatory methods. Maintaining safeguards capability requires technical expertise capable of evaluating the accounting and verification arrangements used by different nuclear facilities and processes.

Emerging reactor technologies may introduce additional requirements where fuel compositions, operating cycles, material flows, or facility configurations differ from those associated with established nuclear installations. Safeguards authorities must be able to assess those differences and determine whether existing verification arrangements remain appropriate.

Fuel handling and material accountancy arrangements are particularly relevant where new reactor designs use different fuel forms or operating practices. The quantities and movement of safeguarded material must remain identifiable through the applicable accounting and control systems.

ONR has also identified civil maritime nuclear applications as an area of emerging regulatory interest. Such applications can present different operational and physical circumstances from land-based nuclear installations, although the memorandum does not identify a particular maritime reactor project or establish new licensing arrangements.

The cooperation framework does not alter either authority’s statutory responsibilities or transfer regulatory powers between the UK and Australia. Decisions concerning domestic safeguards compliance will remain subject to the respective national regulatory systems.

Nor does the agreement constitute approval for a new reactor design, fuel cycle facility, or nuclear propulsion programme. Its immediate purpose is to strengthen the technical and professional resources available to the two safeguards organisations.

ONR and ASNO have not published a programme of individual research projects, associated budgets, or a timetable for staff exchanges and training activities. Those arrangements will need to be developed under the memorandum.

The agreement establishes the framework for that work, with future joint activities expected to address safeguards expertise, regulatory training, and the technical challenges associated with evolving nuclear technologies and material control requirements.


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